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Smith: Banks and Banking--Constitutionality of Statute Waiving Preferenc

RECENT CASE COMMENTS
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AND
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CONSTITUTIONALITY

WAIVING PREFERENCE OF STATE AGAINST DEFUNCT

OF

STATUTE

BANKU. -

Upon

the failure of a bank having state funds on deposit, a proceeding
in mandamus was instituted to compel the receiver of the bank
to prefer the state over all other creditors. The Supreme Court
of Appeals issued the writ, relying on the common law prerogative of the sovereign.1 By a statute operative January 1, 1931,'
the state expressly waived its preference,' but this was held void
'This common law priority did not devolve upon the Federal Government,
but § 3466 of the Revised Statutes definitely gave it that right. U. S. v. State
Bank of N. C., 6 Pet. 29, 8 L. ed. 308 (1832). The Bankruptcy Acts did not
affect the priority. Lewis v. U. S., 92 U. S. 618, 23 L. ed. 513 (1875). But
the Federal Government is not entitled to priority against the assets of an
insolvent national bank. Cook County National Bank v. U. S., 107 U. S. 445,
2 S. Ct. 561 (1883). And it seems to be the majority rule that the prerogative
right, being an attribute of sovereignty, is possessed by the state alone and
not by a county or other political subdivisions of a state. See notes (1925)
36 A. L. R. 640 and (1928) 52 A. L. R. 755. But the county may get such
priority by a special statute, or if the county money is unlawfully deposited,
a preference is usually given on the trust theory. Watts v. Cleveland County,
21 Okla. 231, 95 Pac. 771, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 918 (1908). West Virginia
held this priority inapplicable to a county in County Court v. Matthews, 99
W. Va. 483, 129 S. E. 399 (1925).
There is a split among the states whether, in the absence of statute, the
state is entitled to this preference. Most courts allowing this preference base
their decision, as the West Virginia court did, on the sovereign prerogative,
or on the theory that depositing public funds constitutes a trust which may
be enforced against the receiver or assignee of the insolvent debtor. Page
County v. Rose, 130 Ia. 296, 106 N. W. 744, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 886 (1906);
Wendell v. Jackson, 8 Wend. 18B, 22 Am. Dec. 635 (N. Y. 1831); Lansing
v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 21 Am. Dec. 89 (N. Y. 1829) ; People v. Herkimer, 4 Cow.
345, 15 Am. Dec. 379 (N. Y. 1825); Orem v. Wrightson, 51 Mo. 34, 34 Am.
Rep. 286 (1878).
If the depositing of state money was in violation of law and the bank knew
this, the state will be given a preference. Phillips v. Gills, 98 Kan. 383,
158 Pac. 23, 29 L. R. A. 1917A, 680 (1916).
Some courts require that this. preference be asserted by the state before
the appointment of a receiver if the receiver acquires title to the assets, but
others ignore such a requirement. State v. First State Bank, 22 N. M. 661,
167 Pac. 322, L. R. A. 1918A, 394 (1917) state held not entitled to the
preference after receiver was appointed on theory the preference exists in
favor of the state only so long as title to the money or property remains in
the debtor); Aetna Accident and Liability Co. v. Miller, 54 Mont. 377, 170
Pac. 760, L. R. A. 1918C, 954 (1918) (priority'held not lost by failure of
state to assert it until after appointment of a receiver).
-,The act waiving the preference took effect January 1, 1931; on January
28, 1931, an act was passed postponing the operation of this act until January 1, 1933.
3W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 12, art. 4, § 10. Woodward v. Sayre, 90 W.
Va. 295, 110 S. E. 689, 24 A. L. R. 1497 (1922) held this priority still effective in West Virginia by virtue of article 8 § 21 of the state constitution,
which provides for the continuation in this state of all common law rules in
f9rce therein 4t thh timg the constitution tool; effect and not repugnant thereto,
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as violating article 10, section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution, which reads: "The credit of the State shall not be granted
to, or in aid of any county, city, township, corporation or person." Lawson v. Charter.'
void as
The following transactions have been either
against the state or unconstitutional because in violation of a provision of a state constitution which prohibited the lending of
state credit to private corporations or individuals: an act of the
Missouri Legislature authorizing the issuance of its bonds by way
of donation to a private manufacturing corporation;' bonds issued by the State of Arkansas to aid a private railway;' an act
authorizing the issuance of state bonds and the use of the money
from their sale for the purchase of a farm by a war veteran, to
be turned over to him on long term credit ;" granting of state credit
to a sugar-making corporation;' a Farm Loan Act establishing a
department of farm loans to make secured loans on nonurban
property and to sell bonds evidencing such lendings ;D appropriations of public money to be lent to farmers whose crops had been
destroyed."° These cases are typical of the evil to which constitutional provisions against lending state credit have uniformly
been construed to apply, - the subsidy of private business.
-held

In U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Central Trust Co., 95 W. Va. 458, 121
S. E. 430 (1924) it was held that the state does not lose this preference by
taking security to cover its deposits in a bank. The majority of cases agree
with this, but it is difficult to see why the preference is not waived by taking
security which amply protects the deposits and renders the priority superfluous. See 24 A. L. R. 495. The revisers' note to the above-cited code provision states that it was the express purpose of that section to abrogate the
rule announced in the Woodward and Trust Co. cases above, and to place the
state on a parity with other unsecured creditors.
It is interesting to note that at the time the New Code took effect the
depression was taking a heavy toll in the banking world. Accordingly the
Legislature in 1931 deferred the waiver of the state's preference until February 1, 1933. See W. Va. Acts of 1931, c. 17.
'Lawson v. Charter, 161 S. E. 831 (W. Va. 1932).
5 Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1, 5 S. Ct. 416 (1885).
aMcKittrick v. Arkansas Central Railway Co., 152 U. S. 473, 14 S. COt.661
(1894) (Arkansas constitution of 1864 contained no requirement that popular
sanction expressed at a valid election precede the granting of state aid to
private enterprises. In 1867 an act was passed granting such aid, with no
provision for the approval of voters. The 1868 constitution did, however,
contain this requirement, and the court held the second constitution withdrew
all authority given in previous statutes to lend state credit without first obtaining the consent of the people, so the 1867 act was declared void).
Veterans I Welfare Board v. Jordan, 189 Cal. 377, 208 Pac. 284, 22 A. L. R.

1515 (1922).

8Oxnard Beet Sugar Co. v. State, 73 Neb. 66, 102 N. W. 80, 105 N. W.
716 (1905).
0 Hill v. Rae, 52 Mont. 378, 158 Pac. 826, L. R. A. 1917A, 495 (1916).
1William Deering & Co. v, Peterson, 75 Mlin. 118, 77 N, W, 568 (1898).
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There is unquestionably a debtor-creditor relation created
when state funds are deposited in a bank, but it seems that the
constitutional provision was directed against public subsidies for
private ventures and not against using banks as depositaries of
public funds with the usual incidents of the bank-depositor relation. It thus appears that the constitutional provision was inapplicable to this situation, and it follows that there was no conflict between that provision and the section in the Revised Code of
Fol1931 abolishing the common-law preference of the state.
lowed to its logical conclusion, the view adopted in the principal
case leads to the questionable doctrine that state funds can never
be lawfully deposited in banks, for that act (under this decision)
ipso facto constitutes a pledging of the credit of the state in con,
travention of the constitution.
The reason given for the rule adopted may also be questioned. There seems to have been no substantial reason for planting
the ancient common law rule that "the king can do no wrong" in
this country. In the absence of statute, to justify a preference
a court might frankly assert that the integrity of public funds
is an interest meriting greater legal protection than the funds of
individuals. It sounds artificial to say to-day that where the
state and individuals are creditors of an insolvent debtor, state
funds are given a preference over individual deposits because at
common law the king could do no wrong.
Nor is the rule of state preference itself above criticism. The
weight of authority unquestionably holds the state is entitled to
this preference over private creditors whose claims are on the
same footing.' The state can always secure its deposits by taking corporate surety bonds. The majority rule permits the state
to ignore this safeguard and then, if the bank fails, to protect
itself at the expense of general depositors who had no opportunity
to protect their deposits, and who are thus forced to pay for the
Several states have repudiated
negligence of the state officials.
the theory of state preference," and others have held statutes con"Maryland Casualty Co. v. Rainwater, 173 Ark. 103, 291 S. W. 1003, 51
A. L. R. 1332 (1927).

12Casualty Co. v. Rainwater, swpra n. 12; Comm'r of Banking v. Chelsea
Savings Bank, 161 Mich. 691, 125 N. W. 424, 127 N. W. 351 (1910); Potter
v. Fidelity & D. Co., 101 Miss. 823, 58 So. 713 (1911); Henry v. Alexander,
131 Miss. 588, 94 So. 846 (1923); Middlesex County v. State Bank, 29 N. J.
Eq. 311 (1878), aff'd. in 30 N. J. Eq. 311 (1878); North Carolina Corp.
Commission v. Citizens' Bank & T. Co., 193 N. C. 513, 137 S. E. 5871 51
A, L. R. 1350 (1927); Baxter v, Baxter, 23 S. C. 114 (1885),
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ferring this priority unconstitutional as impairing contractual

obligations.'
There is an increasing sentiment against this
preference because of its obvious unfairness!'
-KNGsLEY

R. SMITH.

CONTRIBUTION WHERE ONE JOINT PRINCIPAL PAYS TORT
JUDGMENT AGAINST AGENT. - A tract of land was owned jointly

by A and B, as executors and trustees of the estate of X, by C,
and by D. An agent, Drebert, had charge of the land for all the
owners when a tenant, Massey, was killed by electrically charged
wire. In an early action a judgment was recovered by the personal
representative of the deceased against A and B, as executors and
trustees. This was reversed,1 as a trust estate is not liable for the
torts of the trustees who are free from the control of the beneficiaries. Thereafter, another suit was instituted against A and B.
and the agent, Drebert. A and B being dismissed from this
suit upon a plea in abatement for defective service of process,
judgment was taken against Drebert, which with costs was paid
by A and B, as executors and trustees.
In the principal case
A and B and C sued the administrator of D, since deceased, for
contribution. Held: Rulings of the trial court that contribution
between joint tort-feasors is not permitted and that the payment
was voluntarily made were error. Payne v. Charleston National
Bank!
At common law there was no contribution between joint tortfeasors,' and because of the unjust effect of the application of the
rule in certain cases exceptions have developed,' and the test most
I Harris v. Walker, 199 Ala. 51, 74 So. 40 (1917) (right of depositors of
an insolvent bank held to have arisen out of a contract with the bank as
controlled by a constitutional guaranty then in force. This was held an
"obligation of a contract" which could not be impaired by either the constitution or a statute); Atchafalaya R. & Banking Co. v. Bean, 3 Rob. 414
(La. 1843) (legislature cannot constitutionally change relative rank of creditors inter se by an act subsequent to the creation of the debt.
"See the comment on Central Trust Co. v. Bank of Mullens, 107 W. Va.
679, 150 S. E. 221 (1929) in (1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 278.
' Massey v. Payne, 109 W. Va. 529, 155 S. E. 658 (1930).
2Payne v. Massey, 164 S. E. 252 (W. Va., 1932).
3Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T. R. 186, 101 Eng. Reprint 1337 (1799);
TsiRoCKMORTON'S CooLEY oN TORTs (Student ed., 1930) § 81.
'Where the party was only technically liable, Chicago Rys. v. R. F. Conway Co., 219 Il. App. 220 (1920); where the ground of liability is negligence in carrying on a lAwful business, Harriban v. City of Des Moines, 198
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